

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
WAYCROSS DIVISION**

DONG YU LONG,

Petitioner,

v.

PATRICK GARTLAND,

Respondent.

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 5:17-cv-50

ORDER and MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Dong Yu Long (“Long”), who was formerly housed at the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) Processing Center in Folkston, Georgia, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1.) Respondent filed a Response. (Doc. 9.) For the reasons which follow, I **RECOMMEND** that the Court **DISMISS as moot** Long’s Petition, **DIRECT** the Clerk of Court to **CLOSE** this case, and **DENY** Long *in forma pauperis* status on appeal.

BACKGROUND

Long filed his Petition on May 10, 2017. (Doc. 1.) Long asserts he unsuccessfully attempted to enter the United States as an émigré. (Doc. 1.) He states he has been in ICE’s custody as an alien subject to a final order of removal since April 7, 2016. He claims he has not been deported within the ninety (90) day period prescribed by law.¹ Long challenges his

¹ Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, “when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days.” 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(1)(A). During that period, the Attorney General must detain the alien. 8 U.S.C. §1231(a)(2). Additionally, the Attorney General may detain certain categories of aliens beyond the 90 day removal period. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). However, any continued detention under that statute must not be indefinite. See Zadyvdas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001) (construing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) to contain a “reasonable time”

detention by claiming he is cooperating with ICE for his removal, is not likely to be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future, and is not a threat to the community. (Id. at pp. 8–9.) Thus, Long requested release from ICE custody.

On July 20, 2017, Respondent filed his Response to Long’s Petition. Respondent maintains Long was released from ICE’s custody, pending removal under terms of supervision, on May 23, 2017. (Doc. 9, p. 1.) Indeed, the Court’s show cause Order was returned as undeliverable to Long because he is no longer at ICE’s processing center in Folkston. (Doc. 7.) Thus, Respondent asserts Long’s release from ICE custody renders his Petition moot, and his Petition should be dismissed.

DISCUSSION

I. Whether Long’s Petition is Moot

Article III of the Constitution “extends the jurisdiction of federal courts to only ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Strickland v. Alexander, 772 F.3d 876, 882 (11th Cir. 2014). This “case-or-controversy restriction imposes” what is “generally referred to as ‘justiciability’ limitations.” Id. There are “three strands of justiciability doctrine—standing, ripeness, and mootness—that go to the heart of the Article III case or controversy requirement.” Harrell v. The Fla. Bar, 608 F.3d 1241, 1247 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). With regard to the mootness strand, the United States Supreme Court has made clear that “a federal court has no authority ‘to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare

limitation in which the Attorney General may detain aliens beyond the 90 day period). The United States Supreme Court has found that six months is a presumptively reasonable period to detain a removable alien awaiting deportation. Id. However, this does not entail that every alien detained longer than six months must be released. Id. Rather, to state a claim for habeas relief under Zadvydas, an alien must (1) demonstrate that he has been detained for more than six months after a final order of removal; and (2) “provide evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Akinwale v. Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002). If a petitioner makes these showings, the burden shifts to the Government to respond with evidence to rebut that showing. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.

principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.” Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (internal citation omitted). Accordingly, “[a]n issue is moot when it no longer presents a live controversy with respect to which the court can give meaningful relief.” Friends of Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Questions of justiciability are not answered “simply by looking to the state of affairs at the time the suit was filed. Rather, the Supreme Court has made clear that the controversy ‘must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.’” Christian Coal. of Fla., Inc. v. United States, 662 F.3d 1182, 1189–90 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975)).

As noted above, Respondent has informed the Court in his Response that Long has been released from ICE’s custody. As Long only requests his release from the custody of ICE in his Petition and he has been released from ICE’s custody, there is no longer a “live controversy” over which the Court can give meaningful relief. Friends of Everglades, 570 F.3d at 1216. Accordingly, the Court should **DISMISS as moot** Long’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

II. Leave to Appeal in *Forma Pauperis*

The Court should also deny Long leave to appeal *in forma pauperis*. Though Long has, of course, not yet filed a notice of appeal, it would be appropriate to address these issues in the Court’s order of dismissal. Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3) (trial court may certify that appeal of party proceeding *in forma pauperis* is not taken in good faith “before or after the notice of appeal is filed”). An appeal cannot be taken *in forma pauperis* if the trial court certifies that the appeal is not taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3). Good faith in this context must be judged by an objective standard. Busch v. Cty. of Volusia, 189 F.R.D. 687, 691

(M.D. Fla. 1999). A party does not proceed in good faith when he seeks to advance a frivolous claim or argument. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). A claim or argument is frivolous when it appears the factual allegations are clearly baseless or the legal theories are indisputably meritless. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). Stated another way, an *in forma pauperis* action is frivolous, and thus, not brought in good faith, if it is “without arguable merit either in law or fact.” Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Brown v. United States, Nos. 407CV085, 403CR001, 2009 WL 307872, at *1–2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2009).

Given the above analysis of Long’s Petition and Respondent’s Response, there are no non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal, and an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Thus, the Court should **DENY** *in forma pauperis* status on appeal.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, I **RECOMMEND** that the Court **DISMISS as moot** Long’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, (doc. 1), **DIRECT** the Clerk of Court to **CLOSE** this case, and **DENY** Long leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*.

The Court **ORDERS** any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation to file specific written objections within **fourteen (14) days** of the date on which this Report and Recommendation is entered. Any objections asserting that the Magistrate Judge failed to address any contention raised in the pleading must also be included. Failure to do so will bar any later challenge or review of the factual findings or legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). A copy of the objections must be served upon all other parties to the action. The filing of objections is not a proper vehicle through which to make new allegations or present additional evidence.

Upon receipt of objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above, a United States District Judge will make a *de novo* determination of those portions of the report, proposed findings, or recommendation to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. Objections not meeting the specificity requirement set out above will not be considered by a District Judge. A party may not appeal a Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only from a final judgment entered by or at the direction of a District Judge. The Court **DIRECTS** the Clerk of Court to serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation upon the parties.

SO ORDERED and **REPORTED** and **RECOMMENDED**, this 29th day of August, 2017.



R. STAN BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA